Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 212-214.

This paper argues that the existing definition of pandemics is not nuanced enough, because it is predicated solely on the criterion of spread, rather than on the criteria of spread and severity. This definitional challenge is what I call ‘the conflation problem’: there is a conflation of two different realities of global health, namely global health emergencies (i.e., severe communicable diseases that spread across borders) and nonemergencies (i.e., communicable or noncommunicable diseases that spread across borders and that may be severe). (...) To put this argument forth, this paper begins by discussing the existing and internationally accepted definition of pandemics, its requirements, as well as its strengths (section 1). Section 2 then considers the problem with the standard definition of pandemics (i.e., the conflation problem) and some examples of it. Finally, section 3 evaluates some practical implications of the conflation problem to then explore conceptual clarity as the adequate solution. (shrink)

Although the value of health is universally agreed upon, its definition is not. Both the WHO and the UN define health in terms of well-being. They advocate a globally shared responsibility that all of us — states, international organizations, pharmaceutical corporations, civil society, and individuals — bear for the health (that is, the well-being) of the world's population. In this paper I argue that this current well-being conception of health is troublesome. Its problem resides precisely in the fact that the (...) well-being conception of health, as an all-encompassing label, does not properly distinguish between the different realities of health and the different demands of justice, which arise in each case. In addressing responsibilities related to the right to health, we need to work with a more differentiated vocabulary, which can account for these different realities. A crucial distinction to bear in mind, for the purposes of moral deliberation and the crafting of political and legal institutions, is the difference between basic and non-basic health needs. This distinction is crucial because we have presumably more stringent obligations and rights in relation to human needs that are basic, as they justify stronger moral claims, than those grounded on non-basic human needs. It is important to keep this moral distinction in mind because many of the world's problems regarding the right to health relate to basic health needs. By conflating these needs with less essential ones, we risk confusing different types of moral claims and weakening the overall case for establishing duties regarding the right to health. There is, therefore, a practical need to reevaluate the current normative conception of health so that it distinguishes, within the broad scope of well-being, between what is basic and what is not. My aim here is to shed light onto this distinction and to show the need for this differentiation. I do so, first, by providing, on the basis of David Miller's concept of basic needs, an account of basic health needs and, secondly, by mounting a defense of the basic needs approach to the right to health, arguing against James Griffin who opposes the basic needs approach. (shrink)

Our society is obsessed with health. At every second, everywhere, we are surrounded and overwhelmed by distressing calls on how vital it is to adopt a healthy lifestyle. While incorporating a healthy diet and physical exercise into our routines are the foremost commandments, everything from tobacco to refined sugars, trans fat, excessive alcohol, caffeine, and even eggs are declared public evils. Yet there is hope: medicines will save us! And indeed medicines exist available for all kinds of human afflictions. There (...) are pills to help you relax and forget about stress, while some others, on the contrary, can keep you miraculously alert. There are pills that heal your most unbearable pains, physical or emotional, wherever their location — the head, back, quadriceps, heart, or soul. Though they may cause your stomach to burn, that is easily remedied by taking a complementary pill that will neutralize your stomach acidity with only some minor and negligible side effects elsewhere. There are also magic pills that promise you happiness, by giving you the power to thrive and the endurance to conquer the world. They ignite your hunger for achievement, but also for extra sugar and saturated fat. (shrink)

The moral value of health : health as a basic human need -- The human right to health and its corresponding responsibilities -- States and natural persons as subjects of justice -- Pharmaceutical transnational corporations as subjects of justice -- The global health governance of the global health crisis.

This paper suggests that the focus on abortion legalization in the aftermath of the Zika outbreak is distracting for policy and lawmakers from what needs to be done to address the outbreak effectively. Meeting basic health needs, together with research and development conducive to a vaccine or treatment for the Zika virus should be priorities.

Human rights advocates often use inflated and thus underspecified terminologies when addressing the content of their claims. One example of such loose terminology is the term ‘well-being’, as currently employed in connection with a definition for the right to health. What I call the ‘well-being conception of health’ conflates the distinct ideas of basic and non-basic health needs, as well as those of individual autonomy and freedom. I call this the conflation problem. This paper argues for the need of an (...) understanding of the right to health, nuanced enough to capture not only these distinct ideas, but also their moral relevance for the common good. (shrink)